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must be of value to that economy. That the world lives largely in poverty means that 
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will be, as oversupply diminishes its value. Richard Freeman termed this process the 
Great Doubling, as with the merging of Russia, China and India into the global 
economy, the world's labour force will more or less be doubled, upsetting the 
current capital to labour ratio in favour of capital. This research focuses on China's 
role and examines the extent of its reserve labour supply and its regional impact in 
order to gauge the implications of China's arrival on the world stage for the capital 
to labour ratio. 
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1     INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this research is to test the validity of two competing theories: that of free-market, 
free-trade globalisation as outlined in Thomas Friedman's (2005) book 'A Flat World'; and of 
the Great Doubling, the fear that due to the large amounts of cheap labour merging 
economies will present to the global labour market, the current capital to labour ratio will tip 
in favour of capital thus causing a race to the bottom in terms of labour standards, as opposed 
to a race to the top as argued by globalisation theory. This research seeks to test these theories 
by examining the nature of China's reserve labour surplus and the implications it might hold 
for the global economy. It is split into three sections, all dealing with distinct topics 
surrounding the debate. The first two deal with internal factors relating to China's reserve 
labour surplus. They examine whether or not China has reached its Lewis turning point, and 
if increasing wages and reported labour shortages really signify that it has. Despite these 
occurrences, a closer examination of China's internal factors reveals that the economy is still 
host to a large reserve labour surplus, and that increasing wages signify not the depletion of 
such, but increasing inequality. 
The third section, itself split into two, deals with the regional impact China has, and might 
possibly have due to this large reserve labour surplus. It does so by first exploring the scope 
that China has in crowding out its neighbours. Due to the nature of China's reserve labour 
surplus it has the capacity not only to upgrade its comparative advantage from low-skill to 
high-skill production while maintaining low prices, it also may have the capacity to maintain 
its position in exporting those low-skill products, thus challenging both  low- and high-
income economies at the two ends of the skill-production ladder. It is found that despite 
China's growing share of global exports, it is possible that, by exporting through China, 
neighbouring economies can benefit from this development. However it appears to be the 
case that for the weaker economies in the region, exports to China are yet to increase 
significantly in importance, while at the same time imports from China are increasing, 
meaning that there is a danger that without entry into complementing niche production, they 
may be left behind by the globalisation process. The second part of the third section deals 
with the idea more directly associated with the existence of undercutting competitive 
practices in labour standards and the pursuit of FDI. This section finds evidence in existing 
and recent literature that supports the claim that MNCs do pursue lower production costs in 
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countries with fewer labour regulations, and that countries do compete for FDI by lowering 
those regulations. 
These sections represent four hypotheses that this research aims to test: Hypothesis 1: China 
has not reached its Lewis turning point; Hypothesis 2: Rising incomes do not signify the 
depletion of China's reserve labour surplus; Hypothesis 3.1: China's increasing share of world 
exports implies a crowding out effect among other regional economies; Hypothesis 3.2: 
MNCs pursue cheaper production costs; Countries compete in terms of these costs, and; 
Countries with high labour standards fail to attract FDI. Each section conducts a treatment of 
the literature, constructing an argument with the use of key concepts, issues and data analysis 
that seek to test the corresponding hypothesis. In addition to the literature, fresh data is also 
used to test the hypotheses. A land to labour ratio is looked at in an attempt to predict when 
China might reach its Lewis turning point. Consumption share of GDP and inequality trends 
are used to illustrate that rising wages do not indicate the depletion of China's reserve labour 
surplus. Finally trade flows and global share of exports help identify whether China is 
displacing other regional economies, or if exports merely being redirected. 
Throughout the literature on this topic, there has been no attempt to draw the factors herein 
under one body of work in order to gauge the impact China will have on the global labour 
market. The literature is extensive but is largely specific to one of the aspects regarded in this 
research. The literature used to construct the arguments for each section of the debate is of 
course only a small sample, but each paper is representative of key points taken from the 
debate. The theoretical debate itself is composed of Thomas Friedman's (2005) globalisation 
theory and proposes a positive outcome and a win-win for both capital and labour in the 
increasingly open global economy, and of Richard Freeman's (2005, 2006) Great Doubling 
thesis that proposes a negative outcome to globalisation as a great influx of cheap labour will 
diminish its value, causing a win only for capital. In dealing with China's Lewis turning 
point, those that argue that it has been reached  are represented by both Paul Krugman (2013) 
and Fang Cai (2008) who point to rising wages and labour shortages as indicative of the 
depletion of China's reserve labour force. The rest of the literature in this section deals with a 
deeper analysis of the situation, as it is made complicated by the segmentation of China's 
labour market due to the hukou household registration system that licences residents between 
urban and rural areas (Das and N'Diaye 2013). It outlines the extensive underemployment in 
China's primary sector (Wang and Wan 2014), and a more appropriate criteria for analysis of 
this situation by use of a Lewis turning period instead of point (Wang and Weaver 2013). 
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In returning to the issue of rising wages (Roberts 2006), the literature in the second section 
outlines the theoretical criteria for a deeper analysis once more, but by looking at 
consumption share of GDP (The Economist 2007), and then at the state of China's labour 
standards (Chan 2003) and labour's diminishing share of growth (Dollar and Jones 2013), and 
the shift from extensive growth and poverty alleviation, to intensive growth and increasing 
inequality (Yang et al. 2010). The third section, dealing with the final two hypothesis, leaves 
China's internal factors to examine the impact it has and may have on regional economies. 
While China's traditional comparative advantage lies in labour-intensive production (Rasiah 
2002), its capacity to innovate and upgrade its comparative advantage is increasing the more 
open it becomes in dealing with the global economy (Xing 2008). The criteria for examining 
China's crowding out effect is outlined by See (2008) and examines trade flows, finding that 
it is a case of redirection rather than displacement. While China doe pose a challenge in this 
respect to the global economy, its future is not predetermined and it is possible for others to 
grow with this burgeoning giant (Altenburg et al. 2008). The final hypothesis is dealt with 
quickly. Daniel Drezner (2006) outlines the criteria for testing the hypothesis, and William 
Olney (2013) and Ronald Davies and Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati (2013) provide 
empirical evidence that makes it difficult to refute too hastily that MNCs are not attracted by 
countries with low labour standards, and that countries compete for FDI by lowering those 
standards. In all, the research outlines an extensive theoretical and conceptual body in the 
construction of the argument aimed at testing these hypotheses, as well as the use of fresh 
data analysis, and it finds that China maintains a large reserve labour surplus, while threatens 
to cause a race to the bottom in terms of labour standards. 
The research is organised as follows. Section two outlines the methodology employed, as 
well as stating the research question and elaborating the hypotheses. Section three begins 
with an introduction to the body of work and outline of the theoretical debate between 
globalisation theory and the Great Doubling theory. It is followed by the subsections: China's 
Lewis turning point; China's income levels, and Regional impact. These sections are further 
and more specific treatments of the literature, the construction of the argument, and are each 
followed by the addition of fresh data analysis, in order to test the corresponding hypothesis. 
Section four outlines the findings while the final section concludes with a discussion of the 
findings in conjunction with the debate. 
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2     METHODOLOGY 
This research seeks to outline a theoretical discourse found within the literature on the topic 
of globalisation and whether or not it presents a race to the bottom in terms of labour 
standards around the world. It does so by first subdividing the topic into three general 
branches that are found within the literature. They concern: China's reserve labour surplus 
and the reaching of the Lewis turning point; rising wages and the signalling of China 
achieving its Lewis turning point, and; the regional impact of China in terms of both 
displacing neighbouring economies' exports and causing a domino-like competition to cut 
standards for the benefit of FDI. Each section is a treatment of the literature regarding key 
arguments relevant to its specific topic. Arguments are presented and countered with the aid 
of evidence as provided by the literature. Each treatment is then followed by fresh evidence 
before the findings are made and discussed. 
The theoretical discourse concerns the debate between free-market, free-trade globalisation 
theory, as embodied in Thomas Friedman's book 'The World is Flat' (2005), and fears that it 
will result in a far lower global equilibrium in terms of labour standards and returns to labour 
as embodied by Richard Freeman's (2005, 2006) theory, the Great Doubling. Taking the later 
as the standard to be tested, Freeman's Great Doubling rests upon some key factors. 
Essentially the theory is concerned with the extent to which merging economies, such as 
China, India and Russia, presents to the global economy an enormous and poor labour force. 
Such an influx of cheap labour will upset the balance in the capital to labour ratio in capital's 
favour. This is essentially the oversupply of labour and the scarcity of capital, resulting in a 
far lower value on labour in the global economy - a disaster for the majority of the world's 
population whose livelihoods depend on returns to labour. This research focuses specifically 
on China and its role in this new equilibrium.  
The questions is thus posed: Does China present to the global economy a reserve labour 
supply large to the extent that it will upset the current capital to labour ratio, resulting in a 
new and lower equilibrium in terms of returns to labour? 
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In order to test this question, hypotheses are outlined according to the subsections outlined 
above: 
Hypothesis 1: China has not reached its Lewis turning point 
Hypothesis 2: Rising incomes do not signify the depletion of China's reserve labour 
surplus 
Hypothesis 3.1: China's increasing share of world exports implies a crowding out 
effect among other regional economies 
Hypothesis 3.2: MNCs pursue cheaper production costs; Countries compete in terms 
of these costs, and; Countries with high labour standards fail to attract FDI 
The theoretical framework employed to test these hypotheses are as follows: H1, China has 
not reached its Lewis turning point. The literature locates the variables in terms of rising 
wages and labour shortages as signifying the depletion of China's reserve labour surplus. 
While H2 deals with these factors more explicitly, this section necessarily counters such a 
claim by way of introducing the notion of market segmentation. China is unique in its 
application of a household registration system known as hukou. This system is a central 
regulatory mechanism controlling the labour market, allocating labour to the urban/industrial 
sector as is deemed necessary. Due to hukou it is difficult to tell simply by looking at rising 
wages and labour shortages the extent of China's reserve labour surplus. Instead the concept 
of a Lewis turning period is employed, and the recognition of both an absolute and a relative 
reserve labour surplus. In order to test the hypothesis a land to labour ratio is examined. This 
ratio illustrates China's relative but significant underemployment in the primary sector. 
Taking average ratios from other economy sets, it is possible to predict when it might be that 
China eventually exhausts its relative reserve labour surplus and exits its Lewis turning 
period. This research finds, holding all else constant, that this will not be until after 2030, 
thus signifying the extent of China's reserve labour surplus. 
H2, Rising incomes do not signify the depletion of China's reserve labour surplus. Due to 
hukou it is not so simple to test this hypothesis by observing wage trends and labour supply. 
In the literature anecdotal evidence is provided that counters the common sense of these two 
reported cases. While wages have risen and millions have been taken out of poverty by 
China's market reforms since 1978, inequality is rising, and conditions for millions caught 
between hukou are pitiful. In order to empirically investigate the evidence of rising wages, a 
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labour share ratio is employed that measures the share of consumption to GDP. That the share 
of consumption is decreasing, this could be that labour is saving. However through the 
literature it is found that China's high rates of savings are maintained by government revenue 
and company profits. This suggests that decreasing consumption to GDP is indicative of 
decreasing labour share of growth. 
H3.1, China's increasing share of world exports implies a crowding out effect among other 
regional economies, concerns international factors, rather than internal ones, and regards the 
implication of there being a large Chinese reserve labour force, rather than testing whether 
one remains. As China is considered to be a middle-income economy, its reserve labour 
supply holds implications for both high- and low-income economies. In terms of implications 
for high-income economies, the literature concerns China's comparative advantage, and while 
this has traditionally been in labour-intensive production, it would seem that it is undergoing 
a process of upgrading, meaning that it could compete with developed economies in the 
production of high-value capital-intensive goods but, due to its reserve labour supply, at a 
cheaper cost. In terms of implications for low-income economies, China poses the threat of 
displacing their exports as, with enough cheap labour, and while competing in high-value 
production, the economy can maintain competitively low production costs in low-value 
manufactures also. In order to examine this more in-depth global export and import shares are 
looked at in order to map shifts between China, the West, and its neighbours, both more and 
less developed. This examination suggests a redirection of exports, rather than a 
displacement, though it is less the case for the weaker economies in South East Asia, 
suggesting an element of displacement by China, as its exports increase to those economies. 
The testable hypotheses for H3.2, MNCs pursue cheaper production costs; Countries compete 
in terms of these costs, and; Countries with high labour standards fail to attract FDI, are set 
out by Daniel Drezner (2006), though are worded differently. 1) Countries more open to trade 
and investment will have fewer regulations that affect the cost of production. This question is 
tackled by William Olney (2013) by OLS regression and it is found that evidence exists in 
support, that there is a positive correlation between openness (higher presence of FDI/MNCs) 
and relatively less regulations that affect the cost of production. 2) There should be a domino 
effect whereby the lack of rigour to this effect will see other countries follow suit. This again 
is dealt with in Olney (2013) by OLS regression, and once again it is found that the evidence 
supports the assumption, countries do compete by lowering those regulations that affect the 
cost of production. 3) There should be a strong negative correlation between inward capital 
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flows and the rigour of country regulatory standards. While Drezner claims that there is no 
evidence to support these claims, on this account again, and by way of recent OLS findings, 
Davies and Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati (2013) provide empirical evidence highlighting 
that while countries compete less in the instituting of such regulations, they do so in 
enforcement, or a lack of rigour. 
Other than the extensive use of literature on the topics in the construction and treatment of 
three general arguments to test the hypotheses, primary data is used in order to support 
findings. It is used where available and is as recent  as was found. In testing the land to labour 
ratio for H1 primary sector employment figures for the period 1978 to 2008 from the All 
China Data Center were used in conjunction with arable land (ha) from the same source in 
order to construct and illustrate the land to labour ratio across this period. Taking recent 
figures for arable land and assuming them as constant, primary sector employment figures 
were added up to 2013 in order to chart an estimated decline in the sector's employment, 
based on its decrease for the decade beginning in 2003. In order to extend the Economist's 
consumption share of GDP figures for H2, data from the PENN World Tables was utilised to 
illustrate the decline in consumption share of GDP for the period 1992 to 2010. Percentage 
share of income or consumption figures from the World Bank was then taken in order to 
construct the per quintile distribution of Chinese wealth, illustrating the growing inequality 
between 1990 and 2009. Extensive use of data from the WTO Trade Profiles, 2006-2013, was 
made in addressing H3.1 in the construction of time series data that was utilised for graphs 3.1 
to 4.4, and the examination of global export and import shares for regions and countries. The 
data used was for merchandise trade and it is pertinent to note that the Trade Profiles for each 
country showed only the top five important export destinations and import origins. Finally for 
H3.2 the recent OLS regression tests in the literature (Olney 2013, Davies and Vadlamannati 
2013) were thought sufficient to address the hypothesis. 
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3      TESTING GLOBALISATION THEORY 
Does China represent to the global economy a race to the top or to the bottom in terms of 
labour standards? 
Globalisation theory states that technological upgrading through continuous innovation 
prompted by competition pushes up labour standards: as middle-income economies 
experience diminishing returns to production they are prompted to attain more sophisticated 
and profitable production through more advanced technology (Friedman 2007, Lin 2011). As 
incomes rise, companies producing lesser sophisticated products seek cheaper sources of 
labour, thus increasing productivity and incomes in low-income economies. As the middle-
income economies' incomes rise and their technological sophistication increases, their 
production begins to compete with high-income economies, who are in turn prompted to 
innovate in the pursuit of greater returns to production, while their traditional production 
companies go elsewhere in pursuit of cheaper labour, thus returning to import those 
traditional products but at a cheaper price, increasing incomes even more (Krugman 1994, 
Bremmer et al. 2006). As long as innovation occurs at the cutting-edge of technological 
production, the process may continue, eventually incorporating all in a global economy, as 
incomes increase everywhere. 
However there exists a counter theory to this that claims globalisation is prompting a race to 
the bottom. While globalisation theory is logical enough, it fails to incorporate an important 
factor. That is, with the emergence of large low- to middle-income countries such as China, 
India and Russia, who lack capital but have large numbers of low-skilled, cheap labour, the 
global economy's capital to labour ratio will come to be skewed very much in favour of 
capital (Freeman 2005). This means that the demand for labour by capital is greatly 
decreased, thus lowering the value, and the leverage, of labour. Suddenly, the process as 
outlined by globalisation theory runs into problems at both ends of production surrounding 
middle-income economies. 
First: the mechanism that prompts high-income economies to innovate toward higher return 
to production. For this to occur the high-income economy must function effectively on capital 
investment. That is, the economy's comparative advantage is maintained by its predominance 
in the technological/production hierarchy. It can afford to take risks as its society is generally 
financially secure and most are so, not through labour, but through capital investment 
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(Bremmer et al. 2006). However, in the transition, as pressure from middle-income 
economies increases, if those middle-income economies achieve comparable levels of 
technological production without raising incomes, then high-income production fails to make 
a gain on the pressure and instead is faced with that production being undercut with direct but 
cheaper competition. The comparative advantage is lost in this direct competition as instead 
of pressure to innovate, it encounters a vacuum that hollows out the foundations upon which 
to advance from (Freeman 2006). Essentially its security is jeopardised as the system 
achieves a new equilibrium where general income comes to rest at a lower level. 
 Second: the opportunities open to low-income economies when middle-incomes rise. These 
opportunities occur when incomes rise in middle-income economies as production and skill 
levels rise. Eventually the labour market becomes too expensive for low-income, low-skill 
production and it seeks to relocate in order to find cheaper labour markets. It is thought that 
the African continent could avail of such opportunities as those Asian economies begin to 
move up the production ladder, freeing that low-skill labour-intensive manufacturing of items 
such as apparel and textiles (Lin 2011). However, if it is the case that China's labour surplus 
has not yet been exhausted, that its Lewis turning point is yet to be achieved, then low-
income production will remain there, soaking up the cheap labour from the rural areas of the 
country and maintaining relatively low incomes throughout the economy so that China, due 
to its enormous population and little relative capital, will come to encapsulate the entire 
production ladder, thus stunting the mechanisms assumed by globalisation theory. The Great 
Doubling, as Richard Freeman (2005) put it, of the global labour force, without the necessary 
capital increase in the global economy, will cause low-skilled production to remain in China, 
forfeiting Africa's opportunity, while also causing Chinese incomes not to rise (as for it to do 
so there cannot be a significant labour surplus) which, as higher-skilled production is 
achieved, means high-income economies face direct competition at undercutting prices. 
If it were the case that the great doubling was to jeopardise the outlined globalisation process, 
this would impact profoundly on high-income economies who, as it is, have experienced 
decades of income stagnation (Freeman 2005, Milanovic 2013), as well as the recent 
recessions. Indeed, financial crashes, austerity measures, capital flight and labour off-shoring, 
being touted as necessary but temporary aspects of globalisation, and required adjustments 
for a return to growth, both in the long term, may well be symptoms of those economies 
moving toward the new and lower global equilibrium. As middle-income economies such as 
China begin to produce what high-income economies traditionally produce but at lower costs, 
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in order to compete, or to stay afloat, those high-income economies are prompted to ask big 
questions of themselves. Can they innovate and maintain the income levels as have come to 
be traditionally relative? Or, must they allow living and labour standards lower to a point in 
line with the new capital to labour ratio equilibrium? And if so, how far lower will be 
politically reconcilable considering that for the top-end of such economies, there has virtually 
been no recession (Freeman 2005, Krugman 2014)? 
Of course, these questions are only valid within the globalisation paradigm. Other questions 
may ask of that theory itself. Has the freeing of capital internationally provided a sound 
global economy? Has it provided, or can it provide the development it has been touted to? If, 
without the necessary relative increase in available capital, the global labour force doubles, 
what alternative processes might we need in order to maintain high-income economies' 
standards of living and the future development of low-income economies? Is it the case that 
due to the large amount of cheap labour the world possesses, and the scant amount of capital, 
we must face the realities of a difficult economic future together globally, where high-income 
economies will face ever more drastic levels of austerity, and low-income economies remain 
facing impassable entry-barriers to the global export markets? 
In order to examine the validity of one or the other theory, globalisation or the great doubling, 
it is necessary to take a closer look at the factors that China presents to the global economy. If 
it is the case that China presents a large labour surplus that skews the capital to labour ratio in 
excessive favour of capital then it may be necessary to reconsider economic policies so that 
labour is not left behind by the development of the global economy. These factors include 
China's labour surplus, the nature of Chinese real income levels, and the impact these factors 
have thus far had on regional economic partners and competitors. Determining these factors, 
however, is not so straight forward. 
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3.1     CHINA'S LEWIS TURNING POINT 
In 2003 Richard Freeman wrote a paper understating the controversial debate regarding 
globalising free trade and its effect on labour. He outlined the argument regarding the effect 
that the increasing global nature of capital flows, whether globalisation would be positive in 
terms of the economic development that would ensue, or negative in respect to the race to the 
bottom, and the general destruction of jobs and livelihoods. The argument according to 
Freeman was essentially over the nature of the globalisation, whether it be the free trade 
brand, or a more managed affair with a greater concern for labour, the environment, and 
ensuring equality and the redistribution of wealth. On the one side labour standards were 
ominous in their propensity to keeping national barriers shut to international trade, while the 
other feared those labour standards would diminish alarmingly as barriers to trade were 
lowered. And surprisingly, in respect to the argument Freeman concluded that the debate was 
somewhat misplaced, that trade policy has merely 'modest impacts on labour markets and 
economic outcomes beyond trade flows', that labour 'standards do not threaten the 
comparative advantage of developing countries, nor do poor labour standards create a "race 
to the bottom". Globalisation and standards are complementary rather than competing 
activities' (Freeman 2003). 
In 2005 Freeman released a paper with an altogether more alarmed tone. He called the core 
concept of his new revelation, the Great Doubling, as it was that, in looking at the low-skilled 
and cheap labour forces the new emerging economies of India, China and Russia, Freeman 
discovered that the capital to labour ratio would be cut by between 55% and 60%. According 
to Freeman the global workforce at 2000 was at around 1.46 billion. The reforms that have 
since seen the opening up of the ex-Soviet bloc, India and China have flooded that global 
labour force with another 1.47 billion workers, and hence, doubling the labour stock, and 
almost halving the capital to labour ratio. Freeman elaborates what this might mean. Far from 
the calm nature of his earlier claims, that globalisation and labour standards are 
complementary, suddenly the abundance of labour in relation to capital meant that the 
balance of power would swing unhealthily toward capital. This would result in the 
plummeting of returns to labour due to the increase of supply and competition for work. 
Freeman uses this new relationship to argue that developing countries who had counted on 
competing in the world markets with labour-intensive, low skilled products for export, would 
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have to find new sectors as they would not be able to compete with manufacturing from 
China due to their low wages (Freeman 2005). 
Also, the traditional division of labour between high-income and low- and middle-income 
countries, whereby the former deals in high-skill products, and the later low-skilled 
manufacturing, was to be offset by this new relationship and the increasing human capital in 
China and India, where wages are still very low. Increasing R&D, numbers of technical 
graduates and increases in technological know-how from greater international economic 
involvement are all causing a tremendous catch-up in China, and due to those low wages, the 
relocation there of high-skill production is an attractive prospect. From sitting on the fence 
between the Washington Consensus and anti-globalists in 2003, in 2005 Freeman concludes 
that the free-trade model must be abandoned . 'The world needs a new model of globalisation 
and new policies that put upfront the well-being of workers around the world' (ibid.). 
However, the degree of impact China holds for the global work force is a point of contention. 
The key to determining the nature of this factor is the Lewis turning point. Before the advent 
of what we generally refer to nowadays as globalisation, Arthur Lewis (1954) described the 
problem of capital accumulation. If capital remains in a closed economy, the demand for 
labour increases (there is more capital and therefore more investment in both opportunities 
and the benefit of carrying out those opportunities) 'and the capitalist surplus is adversely 
affected' (Lewis 1954). In order to avoid this, capitalists could utilise surplus labour reserves 
of other countries, as long as it were an open economy. Lewis describes a dual economy 
(internationally, but the principle applies nationally): 'wages cannot rise in A until capital 
accumulation in B has wiped out B's labour surplus' (ibid.). It is this simple principle that 
comes to the fore in the literature regarding the impact China may or may not have on the 
global labour market. It is described as the Lewis turning point, whereby an economy's 
industrial sector expands through capital investment, absorbing cheap labour from the 
traditional sector until that labour reserve is exhausted, demand for labour increases, and 
therefore wages go up.  
In terms of the globalisation / race to the bottom debate, this is the positive process. However, 
if it is the case that China represents an 'unlimited' labour surplus, capital may continuously 
invest in China's industrial sector, while wages fail to increase. The adverse affects on both 
low- and high-income economies extend from this, and so in order to gauge the nature of the 
situation we must examine China's labour reserve. According to Paul Krugman (2013) this is 
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not an issue. Krugman argues that the signs one would expect from the turning of the Lewis 
point are evident in China's economy. He bases this claim on the observation that wages are 
finally rising. Somehow, in the investment-driven period of reform and phenomenal growth, 
China has seen continued returns from investment, and wages have stayed low despite the 
influx of capital into the country since it's opening up to the global economy. These two 
points suggest that up until recently, and the now-rising wages, China had not reached the 
Lewis turning point (Krugman 2013). Fang Cai (2008) corroborates Krugman's claims 
highlighting, as well as rising wages, recently reported labour shortages in certain parts of 
urban China. According to Cai, in 2003 such shortages were reported in the Pearl River Delta 
region, which then spread to the Yangtze River Delta region, two of China's most important 
industrial hubs. Citing previous work and collaborations Cai points to the nature of China's 
population structure. China's workforce is now ageing and the impact of the one-child policy 
on the positive effects of the demographic dividend and labour surplus is coming to an end 
(Cai 2008). 
An IMF working paper by Mitali Das and Papa N'Diaye (2013) takes a more in-depth look at 
the nature of China's labour surplus. The paper states that wages are suppressed as labour 
moves from the traditional sector to the industrial sector, while expansion of the later is 
encouraged as investment increases productivity without the increasing overheads of rising 
labour costs. Once surplus labour is exhausted  the returns to capital investment decrease as 
wages rise, and it will become less attractive for investment, and that this is the Lewis turning 
point (Das and N'Diaye 2013). The paper corroborates Cai's reports of labour shortages, and 
describes the large increases in migrant wages as anecdotal evidence. Das and N'Diaye also 
highlight the demographic changes, and the ageing of the workforce. However, they also 
propose an alternative reason behind both the rising wages and episodic labour shortages: 
labour market segmentation. As wage growth trails productivity gains, it does not seem to be 
the case that capitalist surplus is being adversely affected, and according to Das and N'Diaye, 
urban employers state scarcity of skill, rather than of labour itself, as causing the wage 
increases. Key to determining China's Lewis turning point is labour market segmentation, and 
the hukou, or, household registration system that determines whether an individual is a citizen 
of urban or rural China. This policy places a clear impediment to the classical nature of the 
labour market as envisioned by Lewis.  
Das and N'Diaye claim that the wage increases do no suggest the exhaustion of labour 
surplus, though they do agree that the end of China's demographic dividends do hint at 'an 
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imminent transition to a labour-shortage economy' (ibid.). They argue, however, that reform 
of hukou, investment in human capital, and greater industrialisation of agriculture could 
greatly increase China's labour surplus, considering agriculture currently consists of around 
half the country's workforce, while the sector's value-added was only 20% of GDP in 2011 
(ibid.). The paper concludes that despite the imminent demographic shift, there still exists a 
generous surplus in terms of underemployment in the traditional sector. Though while this is 
now around 150 million workers, by 2020 Das and N'Diaye estimate it will be 30 million, 
and that the Lewis turning point will be achieved soon after this point, between 2020 and 
2025 (ibid.). 
The emphasis on policy in Das and N'Diaye is enforced by Xiaolu Wang and Guanghua Wan 
(2014) who treat statistical discrepancies regarding population and employment to re-estimate 
urban, rural and migrational employment. Taking Chinese National Bureau of Statistics 
figures and those of the population census of 2010, Wang and Wan argue that while real 
wages grew more than GDP in 2012, to say that this signified China's reaching of its Lewis 
turning point would be inconsistent with other observations. The rural workforce is still very 
large at 396 million (2012), of which 258 million are employed in agriculture. In order to 
illustrate the degree of underemployment in these figures, Wang and Wan argue that China's 
land to labourer ratio is ten times that of other middle-income economies, which would 
suggest that a significant labour surplus remains. They then consider the nature of migratory 
labour, and through their re-estimation, up-scale the number of migrant workers from a 
conservative 68.8 million to 128.37 million. However, that Wang and Wan find that urban 
and rural employment had been under-reported also, suggests that the degree of rural to urban 
labour movement will be less than previously considered, though this does not mean that the 
surplus has been exhausted. Considering the land to labourer ratio, there still exists much 
potential for this transfer. Wang and Wan suggest that this transfer could consist of two thirds 
of the rural workforce before the sector would begin to lose productivity (Wang and Wan 
2014). They also underplay the diminishing demographic dividends, stating that, as it is, the 
ageing workforce can still play its part for another decade or two.  
Wang and Wan declare that the appearance of the Lewis turning point, despite these factors, 
is due to 'institutional bottlenecks' (ibid.). They claim that reform of the hukou system so that 
it encourages longer, permanent and future migration, as well as better social welfare, would 
help unlock the vastly underemployed labour surplus from the traditional sector, pushing 
China's Lewis turning point further into the future. Xiaobing Wang and Nick Weaver (2013) 
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attempt to highlight the complexities missed in the literature's treatment of this topic in 
arguing that Lewis' model describes less a point in time, and more a period, and that if seen in 
a number of stages, the issue becomes more clear. As in Das and N'Diaye, the idea that 
reported labour shortages equate simply with the reaching of China's Lewis turning point, 
conflicts with alternative observations. Yes, urban sector wages are rising, however, when the 
supply of labour is examined, that a surplus still exists poses a puzzle. Wang and Weaver's 
answer, consistent with Das and N'Diaye, and Wang and Wan, is the hukou system and its 
imposed limitations to migration.  
However, Wang and Weaver do not aim to clarify a point, past, present or future. Their aim is 
to simply place texture to the issue in describing it as a period, where hukou is a central 
determining mechanism. They do this by contributing two key elements to the debate: the 
microeconomic foundations of Lewis turning points; and outlining the dynamics of two 
Lewis turning points. Wang and Weaver claim that Lewis' model was not detailed enough to 
describe clearly the case of China's labour surplus. Lewis' model describes three stages, rather 
than one hinge point. Wang and Weaver extend from these stages, two types of labour 
surplus: absolute and relative surplus. Absolute surplus labour is when the marginal 
productivity is lower than or equal to zero. Relative surplus labour is when the marginal 
productivity is greater than zero but still less than the real wage (Wang and Weaver 2013). 
The first stage consists of family units underemployed in agriculture. The second stage is 
achieved when enough labour leaves for the industrial sector so that work becomes 
productive, though productivity still remains below the subsistence it provides. The third 
stage is achieved when this relative surplus has left for the industrial sector and productivity 
comes to determine wages in the traditional sector. Here two Lewis turning points are 
described. Describing these stages in this way helps to clarify the importance of Wang and 
Wan's 'institutional bottlenecks' in determining the length of the period. As previously stated, 
and reflected in Wang and Weaver, reforms to hukou policy can unlock this relative surplus, 
thus doubling the migrant workforce of between 150 and 300 million (ibid.). Wang and 
Weaver predict, consistent with Das and N'Diaye, that it will be another ten years before the 
relative surplus labour is exhausted in China. 
 The land to labour ratio 
In terms of Wang and Weaver's Lewis turning period we can assume that China won't 
exhaust its reserve labour surplus until per capita productivity in the primary sector has 
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reached levels comparable to similarly placed economies (Wang and Weaver 2013, Wang 
and Wan 2014). Despite Wang and Wan's figures being relatively up to date, the figures 
regarding the land to labour ratio were made only briefly despite the importance this ratio has 
regarding the nature of China's reserve labour surplus. Wang and Wan state that the average 
acreage of nine high-income economies (the US, Canada, Australia, the UK, Germany, 
France, Italy, Japan and South Korea) that a labourer in the primary sector has to work is 42.5 
ha, while for top middle-income economies (Brazil, South Africa, Mexico and Poland) the 
amount is 5.8 ha (ibid.). They state that the per capita arable land in China is 0.47 ha which is 
a clear indicator of underemployment in China's traditional sector. 
Taking figures for cultivated land and employment in the primary sector from 1978 to 2008 
for China from the National Statistics of the All China Data Center (All China Marketing 
Research 2014), the ratio was at 0.41 in 2008. Arable land had been increasing from the 
beginning of this period until 1996 where it remained constant for a decade before decreasing 
in 2007 and 2008 consecutively. It would be expected that due to pollution and urban 
expansion China's arable land will continue to decrease. Employment in the primary sector 
had been steadily increasing from the beginning of this period until 2002, with a large and 
sudden increase, and then a return to the previous rate of  incline, between 1990 and 1996. 
From looking at China's reform periods this might be due to the phasing out of the dual track 
system whereby the state sector saw contraction, which may have led to a return of many 
labourers to work the land (Naughton 2006, p91-98). Due to the fierce rate of growth in 
China's private sector, this 'hump' would have been quickly reabsorbed, though the primary 
sector returned to increase despite this (see appendix 1.1).  
Since 2003, however, employment in the primary sector has been gradually but steadily 
declining, which has increased the land to labour ratio correspondingly. Holding the amount 
of arable land steady from 2008, adding employment figures for 2009 to 2013 and assuming 
the rate of change in employment since it began to decrease, between 2003 and 2013, it is 
possible to predict continued, estimated decline in primary sector employment to forecast the 
land to labour ratio, and when this might reach varying points (see appendix 1.2). Taking the 
land-area as constant, China's land to labour ratio would reach 1.22 with 100 million 
labourers employed in the primary sector. The ratio would reach 4.87, closer to the higher 
middle-income economies', with a primary sector labour force of 25 million. Taking the rate 
of change in primary sector employment between 2003 and 2013, China would expect to 
reach this first ratio figure of 1.22 in 2024, and would not reach 4.87 until 2030. 
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Of course, further pollution and urban expansion will diminish arable land thus pushing these 
figures forward, meaning we would estimate the second Lewis turning point and the end to 
relative labour surplus sooner rather than later. However, economic slowdown and the 
prioritisation of tackling pollution over poverty might mean urban expansion slows and 
pollution recedes, causing the ratio to diminish or slow down at least. Technological 
advancements across the economy might alter this estimation as it would increase 
productivity, therefore incentivising greater departure from the primary sector twice over 
with rising industrial wages, and even less to do in agriculture. Reform of the hukou would 
also lend to the releasing of this labour force into the industrial sector and a far quicker rate of 
rural to urban absorption of the relative labour surplus (Das and N'Diaye 2013, Dollar and 
Jones 2013, Wang and Weaver 2013, Wang and Wan 2014). 
 
3.2     CHINA'S INCOME LEVELS 
Another key branch of literature treats more specifically the nature of China's wages, 
independent of discussions regarding the Lewis turning point (though the principle in doing 
so is a logical extension of this). As was outlined in the previous section, whether or not 
Chinese wages are rising signifies important trends, both in terms of China's national 
economy, and for the global economy. In the literature, as with the extent of China's labour 
surplus, there are varying accounts of the direction China's wages have gone since the 
reforms, and where they might be going to. Due to the complexity of these trends, an in depth 
examination of them is warranted. As in the previous section, it is not enough to simply state 
that wages are rising, and then conclude that this signifies the exhaustion of China's labour 
surplus. It is necessary to determine the trends of these wages set against other trends such as 
household share of national income and returns to capital investment and productivity, the 
foreign exchange rate and national growth as relative to other economies' GDPs.  
Indeed, China has experienced phenomenal rates of annual growth since 1978 and the 
beginning of the reform period. It is unquestionably our history's most phenomenal case of 
development, as in a mere thirty year period this phenomenal growth transformed a poverty 
rate of 64% in 1978 to 10% by 2004 (Dollar 2007). This is real and extensive poverty 
alleviation for millions of people, a success story for high levels of GDP growth. This growth 
has been driven by China's gradual opening up from a centrally planned economy to an ever-
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liberalising free-market economy. As is consistent with globalisation and free trade theory, as 
the economy grows, standards of living and incomes rise with its expansion. It seems a 
natural thing, in the decade since China's accession into the WTO, that wages should begin to 
rise. For Cai (2008) and Krugman (2013), China has simply hit the wall, and there is not 
much more to it. The economy, if it can rebalance growth's dependence away from its high 
levels of investment and toward greater consumption (easier said than done), is simply 
maturing, and perhaps shedding the remnants of its socialist trappings. 
Dexter Roberts (2006) outlines as much and, in line with Cai and Krugman, declares that it is 
the reported labour shortages that are boosting wages by 40% (in 2005). According to 
Roberts, wages are booming and companies simply cannot find the amount of employees 
necessary for maximum productivity. These increased incomes have impacted the profit 
margin by 5% and for Roberts, this signals the end of China's surplus labour as its wages are 
finally closing the gap with other economies. The impact this will have will be worldwide 
inflation, thus placing pressure on China (and presumably elsewhere) to push up the 
production line (Roberts 2006). And so, the globalisation cycle continues, with low-skill 
production looking elsewhere for cheaper labour. According to Roberts, companies have 
begun to do this, leaving China's established industrial zones along the Yangtze and Pearl 
River deltas, and moving inland, soaking up the labour reserve.  
However, prices will still rise as it isn’t simply a case of quantity, but quality of labour that is 
placing a pressure on production costs. There appears to be skill mismatches that account for 
these labour shortages, while low-skill production moves inland (ibid.). This at least is one 
detail beyond the surface of labour shortages, and it would seem, as was the case in the 
previous section regarding labour surplus, the case of rising wages is one of complex details. 
According to The Economist (2007), China has experienced a decline in the consumption to 
GDP ratio. This has been explained elsewhere by high savings but that China's saving level is 
declining, it is indicative of a sharp drop in household's share of national income. Households 
attain a share of the national income through increased wages, through central wealth 
redistribution, or through capital investment. As this share decreases, profits and government 
revenues are rising, indicating that the previously extensive economic growth that lifted 
millions out of poverty is becoming more intensive in the later era of reforms. Share of wages 
in GDP dropped from 53% to 41% between 1998 and 2005 (Economist 2007). The 
Economist attributes this to the large labour surplus. Not only is the surplus suppressing 
wages through over-supply of labour, but due to China's inadequate financial sector small 
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industry is expanding slowly, and failing to incorporate the low-skilled work force (ibid.). 
The picture this paints is of rising inequality in China, of intensive rather than extensive 
growth. 
This inequality helps go toward clarifying the schism between reports of rising and of falling 
wages. Not only is China competing internally for capital, but internationally the rivalry for 
FDI in low-skilled production is fierce, and this is another factor behind what at a second 
glance appear not to be rising wages (Chan 2003). In fact the minimum wage of the US is 
twenty times higher than of the competing developing economies of the Asian region, and 
between those economies, China, with higher costs of living, is reported to have wage 
standards as low as Vietnam and Cambodia (ibid.). Beyond this external suppression of 
standards, it is reported that Chinese minimum wages tend merely to keep pace with inflation, 
meaning instead of in keeping with the official standard of rising within 40% and 60% of the 
average wage, they often fall below this 40% minimum (ibid.). Since the early 1990s, in 
order to attract FDI, the Chinese minimum wage levels have stagnated. Not only this but 
official minimum wages are merely that which is reported to have been paid, and due to the 
nature of the large migratory labour force, it is common that workers are either paid below 
this standard or are paid weekly rates rather than hourly, meaning that they could work 
anywhere up to 80 hour weeks for this rate (ibid.).  
Anita Chan's account of China's minimum wage amounts to an internal race to the bottom. 
The factors outlined are: the large labour surplus; the decentralisation of minimum wage 
settings where local government turns a blind eye to exploitation; no autonomous labour 
union movement - such organisations are under the remit of the government; and the hukou 
system, as it allows for the fluctuation of the labour supply to run concurrent with demand, 
and maintain a tight control over labour. This account is furthered by David Dollar and 
Benjamin Jones (2013) who reflects also The Economist's claim that labour is experiencing a 
low share of national income.  According to Dollar's figures, mean global labour share of 
income, from a broad international sample, is 0.66, with 72% of the sample lying between 0.6 
and 0.8 (Dollar and Jones 2013). Between 1935 and 1985, the UK and US labour share of 
income lay between 0.6 and 0.75. China's, on the other hand, was 0.5 in 1993, placing it then 
in the bottom 10% in terms of labour share of income. In 2007 the share has reduced to 0.43, 
the lowest of this figure seen, and still in decline (ibid.). Dollar and Jones place emphasis, as 
those above have, on the hukou system. He outlines its history as originating in the Maoist 
era, and being a strict replica of a Soviet system to delineate those necessary for State 
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industry. However, due to the demand for labour since the reform period, the system has 
relaxed resulting in this migrating labour force. According to Dollar and Jones, the wages of 
migrating labourers is 45% of urban labourers (ibid.). Dollar and Jones outline a model that 
evidences the hukou system both maintains China's surplus labour and depresses labour's 
share of income. He claims that if hukou was relaxed further, labour would eventually return 
to the global average, but for now it is to remain. 
Dennis Yang, Vivian Chen and Ryan Monarch (2010) wrote a paper that takes a deep look at 
the nature of China's real wage in order to compare them internationally and assess whether 
or not China has lost its labour advantage. The paper states that while real wages had indeed 
increased seven fold between 1978 and 2007, growth has been uneven. And despite the large 
interest due to such increases, the likely passing of the Lewis turning point in 2009 or 2010, 
and the decreasing attractiveness for FDI to invest in China's economy, documentation on the 
nature of China's wages is lacking. So while wages have been growing at a high pace, their 
income rates are only reaching levels comparable to developing Asian neighbours, and are 
between 7% and 20% of developed neighbours such as Japan and Hong Kong. The rates of 
wage increases had been moderate, between 3% and 5% since the beginning of reforms and 
1997. In the decade that followed, however, and surrounding China's WTO membership, 
wages increased at an annual rate of 13.2%. The paper corroborates previous claims that the 
initial phases of reforms saw extensive growth, but equity has since disappeared and regional 
inequality is severe, with 30% to 40% wage discrepancies between coastal industrial zones 
and rural regions more inland (Yang et al. 2010). This regional inequality explains rising 
wages and labour shortages, while failing to dismiss labour surplus. By the late 1990s, 
regional inequality became apparent to the point that the government intervened to rebalance 
the growth away from those coastal industrial zones, and the rate of inequality had reversed 
by 2006-2007 (ibid.). 
The other vector of inequality lies between skill levels. According to Yang et al. wages in 
skill-intensive sectors have rocketed since the early 1990s. In 1990 some labour-intensive, 
such as construction work, wages were 14% higher than skill-intensive jobs in industries like 
banking and insurance. By 2007 this rate was 260% in the reverse (ibid.). Returns to 
education in China are now 10% per year of education, where they had been 3% or 4% in the 
1980s. The suppression of low-skilled, labour-intensive sector wages is due to the large 
migrant workforce of 130 to 200 million. High-skilled sector wage increases account for all 
of China's wage increase figures, exacerbating the inequality of China's late-reform growth. 
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And so, despite claims of rising wages in China, the reality is that manufacturing wages are 
still far below developed countries. It would seem that China's comparative advantage in 
large reserves of cheap labour has yet to diminish (ibid.). 
The labour share 
To return to the decline in consumption share of GDP as stated in The Economist (2007), that 
it has continued to do so since is reflected in the PENN World Tables (Heston et al. 2012). It 
has continued to drop, though at a less aggressive rate, to 2010 (see appendix 2.1). That it has 
done so at all is indicative of increasingly lowering household share of national income. In 
Dollar and Jones (2013) this appears to remain being the case as three out of four methods 
display a continual decline in terms of labour share at a high rate, while the fourth does so at 
a gradual one, all up to the 2010 period. That savings are increasing in China was found to be 
less due to households, and more thanks to government and firms, with rising revenues and 
profits (Kuijs 2005). Household savings ratio increased dramatically between the beginning 
of reform and the mid 1990s (Modigliani and Cao 2004). After 1994, however, this ratio saw 
a dramatic decline. If it is the case that this decline has remained consistent for the decade 
that followed, in conjunction with the declining consumption to GDP ratio, it would signal an 
ever decreasing labour share, or household share of national income, as reflected in Dollar 
and Jones (2013). 
 
Table 2 The increasing disparity between the top and bottom tiers of Chinese society 
 
1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2009 
Top 40.70% 43.20% 43.30% 46.10% 48.60% 47.9% 47.1% 
60-80% 22.60% 22.30% 22.30% 22.20% 22.20% 22.2% 23.2% 
40-60% 16.50% 15.80% 15.80% 15% 14.30% 15% 15.3% 
20-40% 12.20% 11.30% 11.30% 10.30% 9.40% 9.9% 9.7% 
Bottom 8% 7.40% 7.20% 6.40% 5.50% 5% 4.7% 
 
Source: World Bank 2014                                                                                                                                  
Note: Percentage share of income or consumption is the share that accrues to subgroups of population indicated 
by quintiles 
 
Indeed the gap between the top and bottom of China's society has been increasing since the 
1990s (see table 2). Given these trends, and that they suggest a development toward intensive 
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rather than extensive growth, it would appear that claims to the notion that China's wages are 
increasing, thus signalling the depletion of a surplus of labour, are contrary to the reality. 
Wages for many appear to be lowering and as has been argued throughout the literature, this 
is largely thanks to the impediment on the transfer of labour from rural to urban China (Chan 
2003, Dollar and Jones 2013, Yang et al. 2010). 
 
3.3     REGIONAL IMPACT 
In the literature on globalisation and fear of a race to the bottom, two main sub-topics arise. 
There exists on one hand a fear that, due to the country's large surplus labour and increasing 
level of technological sophistication, China will crowd out their regional competitors in the 
export markets. This is feared to happen both in terms of both low- and middle-value goods 
and manufactures such as textiles, apparel and low-tech consumables, made at lower costs 
due to the large, unskilled and cheap labour force, but also in high-value, capital- and 
knowledge-intensive technologically sophisticated products with the high number of 
scientific and engineering PhD students China is graduating yearly. On the other hand, there 
is a fear that due to China's low wages and large labour force, its neighbours, in competing 
for FDI, will begin to suppress their wages, and lower labour standards as it is thought that in 
the pursuit to maximise profits, MNCs will relocate to the source of the cheapest labour 
force. Lowering regulations, minimum wage, labour and environmental standards, and taxes 
all lower the cost of production on the profit margin of companies, and it is possible that due 
to China's enormous work force, the balance that had existed will be tipped, and its smaller 
neighbours will drop these standards in order to appear more attractive to foreign companies 
and also to maintain what capital they already have from fleeing to China. 
China poses a very grave threat in this respect. Since their reforms they have become the 
chief exporter of labour intensive goods, and their accession to the WTO means they will 
develop an even greater presence in world markets (Rasiah 2002). The tariffs and quotas that 
were lowered by the WTO during the last decade has resulted in exposing China's 
neighbours' economies to cheaper imports and due to the nature of China's labour force, they 
then pose the largest threat to exporters. In 1999 the South East Asian economies had only 
36.6% of China's 1,25 billion population, and only 71% of its GDP. This coupled with the 
fact that largely those Asian economies are not sufficiently advanced in technological 
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production, greater openness means that China's manufacturing capability will result in a 
hollowing out of those economies' industries (ibid.). There are four factors to consider in 
examining the threat from China to the region's economies: manufacturing value-added; 
exports; FDI; infrastructure.  
In terms of value-added, China's rate in production increased at a greater rate than its 
neighbours throughout the 1990s as it integrated into export markets, and stood at 75.9% 
value-added in 1998 (ibid.). While gains were made elsewhere, due to China's size and the 
lowering of tariffs and quotas, China remained a more attractive location for the production 
of labour-intensive goods. As for exports, South East Asia region's exports was 6.4 times that 
of China's in 1978. By 1998 it was only 1.1 times China's share. Accession to the WTO will 
have decrease this ratio further (ibid.). The region's market share was three times China's in 
1985 but by 1998 they had an equal share. China's expansion into the high-tech export market 
could mean it takes over places like Singapore while its low-tech exports would overwhelm 
Indonesia, Philippines, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. In respect to FDI, China has 
become the largest recipient of foreign capital flows among developing economies during the 
1990s. In 1982 China attracted 6.5% of the share of FDI, but by 1999 their share increased to 
69.7% (ibid.). After WTO membership and lowering of tariffs and quotas, this share will only 
have increased. And while China's comparative advantage is in labour-intensive industries, 
the build up of their R&D infrastructure is increasing their capacity to innovate. 
The implications of these developments for regional employment are that due to China's 
labour force size, their WTO membership, and the low income levels, FDI inflows will be 
large, while outflows might not be that extensive. This means jobs will be taken from 
neighbouring low- and middle-income economies. While China has experienced a high rate 
of income level increases, productivity rates were even higher which maintains low labour 
costs and causing greater regional pressure. This increased pressure on labour demand leads 
to intensified competition for capital and in the South East Asian economies this means the 
likely weakening of labour union movements and lowering of wages. Unions in Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand have reported that MNCs have threatened to relocate to 
China if activity was not kept to a minimum (ibid.). While integration could lead to stronger 
industrial relations frameworks and a complementary development, existing power 
asymmetries will result in competition instead. Rising wages in China could mean that 
neighbours could benefit from expanding markets, but due to the scope of China's production, 
they may just be self-sufficient in this respect. Thanks to China's size, past investment and 
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R&D rates, and its science and engineering graduate rates, the South East Asian economies 
will need to work even harder to avoid engaging in a race to the bottom of labour standards 
(ibid.). 
3.3.1     Crowding out 
These developments largely deal with low- to middle-income economies. However, as 
mentioned briefly above, China possesses the capacity to increase its grasp on high-value 
production export markets. While the country's comparative advantage lay in labour-intensive 
industries and exporting such largely drove growth in the reform period, China's production 
capacity can be enhanced through technological progress, greater FDI inflows, and increased 
international trade (Xing 2008). Not only will this lead to increased competition from China, 
but it will effectively alter the economy's comparative advantage as its share in export of 
high-tech products increases. In 2002 these exports were worth US$67 billion. In only two 
years this figure had reached US$166 billion (ibid.). By 2004 China had become the world's 
number one exporter of information and communication technologies (ICTs), exporting more 
than Japan, the EU or the US (ibid.). The factor that has helped China in this respect is the 
increasing fragmentation of the global production line. Due to the previously stated factors, 
China has benefited the most from this development. And while the US import rate of such 
goods has increased, China's exports to the US has grown with that rate, while its neighbours' 
share has stagnated, suggesting that China has indeed managed to crowd out the South East 
Asian economies in this industry (ibid.). 
While there appears to be evidence of this crowding out effect, there do exist alternative 
predictions in the literature. Geoffrey See (2008) argues that it is too simplistic a view to 
claim that due to China's large labour force and low wages that the South East Asian 
economies will be displaced in their exports to the EU or US, and that increased markets in 
the region will result in complementarity rather than competition. In terms of an increasing 
share of trade from China to the US, this may be more a case of redirection, rather than total 
displacement. China's exports contain a high import content with, according to See, only 15% 
value-added production. Therefore China's export gains do not come totally at the expense of 
its neighbours. The increase in apparent statistical evidence can be explained not by an 
increase in sole Chinese manufacturing and exporting, but in increasing importing to export, 
whereby its neighbours are still highly involved in the production chain, particularly if 
China's value-added only amounts to 15%. And as for China diverting FDI away from its 
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neighbours, See argues that: China is investing in its neighbours; that 30% to 40% of reported 
FDI to China is in the form of repatriated earnings; and in terms of relative economic size, the 
amount of FDI China receives is comparable to the regional economies, perhaps even less 
(See 2008).  
However, See admits that FDI to China has doubled in the period between 1999 to 2008, 
while technological capabilities will increase further due to rising income levels in relevant 
industries, meaning that China could indeed displace neighbouring economies in those export 
sectors. The removal of quotas as stated by Rasiah (2002) and WTO accession for China, 
allowed them to take a share from economies in the textile export markets. China's share of 
US imports in these goods rose to 55.8% in 2005, while Asia in general fell by 7.71% (See 
2008). The Asian share of the market fell by 3% between 2004 and 2005, except for China's 
share, who's share of EU imports was 40.87% while Asia's, as a whole, was only 13.37% 
(ibid.). Despite the gains being made by China in terms of export markets relative to its Asian 
neighbours, See argues that the region as a whole could benefit if they were to develop their 
industries in niche markets that complemented China's growing industries. When the value-
added and production chain arguments are considered, the data overstates the idea that China 
is dominating the markets and crowding out neighbours. Instead it is the case that 
complementary arrangements, with limited competition are developing (ibid.). 
Regardless of this argument, in terms of the global market it would appear that it is the Asian 
region as a whole that is driving economic change, with this shifting of the production chain 
form West to East. Key to future developments towards China's further impact on the global 
economy is its growing capacity to innovate, and what these shifting production chains might 
mean in this respect. According to Tilman Altenburg, Hubert Schmitz and Andreas Stamm 
(2008), the idea that China may only compete in low- to middle-value export products is 
diminishing as their capacity to innovate is closing with advanced economies. Currently the 
EU, US and Japan compete in the global markets on the basis of their power to innovate, as 
production and manufacturing has already experienced extensive off-shoring. If China, with 
its lower production costs, was able to innovate in cutting edge technologies, the 'bedrock of 
their prosperity [could] crumble' as it would be difficult for the West to upgrade in such a 
radical altering of the traditional division of labour (Altenburg et al. 2008). However, 
currently China's capabilities are not sufficient in mounting such a challenge, though they are 
increasing and it would be a mistake to think that the West had a monopoly on innovation 
(ibid.).  
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China's rate of increase in the field of innovation has been immense. It is helped on by highly 
skilled and motivated individuals who have returned from working in the West, encouraging 
global professional networks that increase China's capacity for innovation. This has been 
coupled with high rates of state investment in R&D infrastructure, their purchasing of 
technologies, and ability to hire the world's top talents, and also the bargaining leverage of 
access to future domestic markets for foreign investors has led to China's increasing capacity 
in sophisticated production (ibid.). However these capabilities still lag behind the West and 
China's comparative advantage still lies in low factor-cost production, though this is no 
longer simply labour intensive industries. For advanced countries this could mean one of 
three outcomes. Altenburg et al. outline these outcomes as ranging from worst to 
compromised, to best: The best case scenario sees Chinas developments as being stunted by 
some externality such as political or environmental upheaval. This will lower investment 
allowing advanced economies to consolidate their position in the top tier of tech production; 
The compromise would be that China's catch-up continues but the gap never closes due to an 
increase in productivity and further tech advancements made by the developed economies; 
The worst case scenario is that China fully catches up and successfully challenges the 
advanced economies in their core competences, therefore undercutting them and reducing 
their rents, allowing for extensive off-shoring in all sectors to drift toward cheaper sources of 
all round production (ibid.). 
3.3.2     Labour standards 
The race to the bottom theory assumes a pressure for convergence in standards from the 
increasingly international mobility of trade and capital flows, and that the size of such flows 
overwhelm the ability of the state to act contrary to market forces (Drezner 2006). Due to 
increases in capital mobility states seek to lower costs of production as capital seeks higher 
profits. If this is the case, according to Daniel Drezner, we should be able to observe three 
trends: Countries more open to trade and investment will have fewer regulations that affect 
the cost of production; there should be a strong negative correlation between inward capital 
flows and the rigour of country regulatory standards; and there should also be a domino effect 
whereby the lack of rigour to this effect will see other countries follow suit. However, 
Drezner argues that the evidence suggests that the assumptions underpinning this theory are 
wrong. The anecdotal cases in support of such assumptions can be countered by the same but 
from the alternative position, and while countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Panama and 
Zimbabwe exempt their special industrial zones from labour regulations, it has not seemed to 
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place pressure on others as they have not done so also. For instance, Drezner continues, 
during the 1990s the Dominican Republic and Philippines instituted regulations in their 
special industrial zones (ibid.). Also there is no evidence that companies direct investment to 
countries with low labour standards and that 90% of FDI goes to advanced economies 
suggests that capital pursues high labour standards (ibid.). Drezner argues this claim by 
describing companies as now possessing more nuanced preferences in that: if they have to 
face regulations they would campaign that other regions would institute them also; as well as 
this, corporate culture has evolved to internalise public image and labour regulations now 
matter to brand reputation (ibid.). 
But Drezner never really seems to fully address his three stated issues. And while there is not 
a huge amount of documentation testing these assumption, two recent papers have done so 
and reported empirical evidence through means of OLS tests that counter Drezner's 
assertions. William Olney (2013) addresses whether or not MNCs are attracted to low labour 
standards, and if, based on this, countries are engaged in the practice of undercutting their 
standards in order to attract MNCs, the domino effect, or race to the bottom. According to 
Olney when employment protection rules are less strict and the cost of production is lowered, 
this does attract FDI. When FDI is divided into two camps, vertical (footloose) and horizontal 
(necessary proximity to local markets), a significant and positive correlation is found between 
FDI inflows and low labour standards, and particularly in the case of vertical FDI (Olney 
2013). Olney also finds that when competing countries lower standards, hosts of FDI do 
indeed follow suit, and that a significant and negative correlation exists between protection 
and FDI, which therefore suggests that FDI does respond to restriction on capital to labour. 
These findings, Olney claims, make it at least a little more difficult for pro-globalist theorists 
to dismiss the race to the bottom theory (ibid.). 
Complementary to Olney's paper, Ronald Davies and Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati 
(2013) examines the third issue, that is, the rigour of countries' regulatory standards. Davies 
and Vadlamannati argue that while there may be limited evidence in terms of the instituting 
of labour laws and standards, there is more and open competition in labour standard practice 
and enforcement. Again through OLS tests, it is found that average labour rights, practices, 
and laws declined over the time series sample, suggesting a race to the bottom. The paper 
finds that OECD countries have higher and more stable standards, and competition here 
exists between laws (though being higher and stable, this competition would be limited) 
(Davies and Vladamannati 2013). However, between developing countries, and between 
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developing countries and developed countries, the competition seems to exist in practice and 
enforcement, and that there is a robust positive and significant spatial lag and an evident 
decline in labour rights indexes across time suggesting competition for FDI rather than 
complementarity in strategic practices and industrial relations (ibid.). 
Redirection or displacement 
Since 2006 the WTO has provided Trade Profiles for its members. Taking figures from 2005 
to 2012 for Asian countries it is possible to map the varying and shifting shares of exports 
and imports for both the global, regional and bilateral pictures. In this period China's share of 
global exports, while being lower than the East Asian economies (Japan, South Korea, 
Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong, herein labelled G1) has steadily risen while G1's share 
has decreased slightly, though the period ended with an increase in share (see appendix 3.1). 
The South East Asian economies' (Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and Philippines, herein 
labelled G2) share of global exports has been considerably lower than China or G2's, but has 
increased slightly in this period. On closer inspection (appendices 3.2, 3.3), it would appear 
that for G1, discounting Taiwan, who experienced a slight decrease in its share, China's 
increased share of global exports came at the expense of Japan, while South Korea, Singapore 
and Hong Kong all ended the period with slightly higher shares. As for G2, both Thailand 
and Indonesia have slightly higher shares of global exports, while Malaysia and Philippines 
have slightly lower. From these trends, it would seem that Japan is the only real loser to 
China's significantly increasing share of global exports. Indeed if we look at US imports for 
this period, while China's share has risen from 15% to 19.1%, Japans has decreased from 
8.2% to 6.4% (see appendix 3.4).  
See (2008) claims that while China's share of global exports is increasing, and Asia's to the 
West is declining, this is less an act of displacement, and rather one of redirection. Exports 
from both the G1 and G2 economies to China are on the up, supporting the idea of redirection 
(see appendices 3.5, 3.6). Looking at the region as a whole (excluding China), it is evident 
that exporting to China is becoming of increasing importance in contrast with lowering 
exports to the West (see appendix 3.7). Considering these current shifts in trade flows it 
would appear that, while China is continuing to take a larger portion of the pie, it is providing 
a rerouting for neighbouring export economies, rather than simply stemming their individual 
flows. In terms of inter-regional trade, for all G1 economies, China is becoming a more 
important export destination than other G1 economies (see appendices 3.8, 3.9). However, 
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this trend is proving more gradual for G2 economies to emulate as G1 countries are still 
generally more important export destinations, while increases of China's shares have been 
slight (appendices 4.1, 4.2). This puts somewhat of a dampener on the idea that the lower-
income economies in the region can latch onto China's growth into the global markets, 
though doesn’t discount the possibility. In fact, while for the G1 economies, the shares of 
imports from China are remaining largely consistent, shares of imports from China to G2 
economies are all on the rise (see appendices 4.3, 4.4). This puts another impediment on See's 
argument as it means that more imports to the weaker economies in the Asian region are 
coming from China. As long as China's production costs remain low, this will be a problem 
for the G2 economies as they will find it difficult to compete and secure their own industry 
base. 
 
4     FINDINGS 
In order to determine the validity of the race to the bottom theory's claims of universally 
lowering labour standards at the hand of ever-mobile capital and globalisation, three key 
issues have been examined. The first of these was China's Lewis turning point. In order to 
test the extent of Richard Freeman's Great Doubling thesis, it was necessary to examine the 
nature of China's reserve labour surplus, to see if it was large to the point that Freeman 
feared, and would tip the balance of the capital to labour ration in favour of capital. If it is the 
case that China's labour surplus is large to this extent, their economy could challenge low- to 
middle-income economies with its large reserve of low-skilled labour, but also high-income 
economies on account of the high number of technical graduates on relatively lower wages.  
According to Krugman and Cai, the sight of wages rising at all, and that there have been 
reported labour shortages means that this simply is not the case. However, on further 
inspection, it would appear that segmentation of the labour force in the rural-urban divide due 
to the hukou system has resulted in rising wages and labour shortages despite the still existing 
labour surplus. That wages are rising is less of an effective issue in terms of signalling the 
turning of Chinas Lewis moment considering its rate is not as great as the rate of increasing 
productivity in the economy. Upon even further inspection and the concept of turning points 
and surplus labour in the conventional sense is put on hold as it comes to be that China's rural 
labour is hugely underemployed, and consisting of, beyond an absolute surplus, a relative 
labour surplus whose gradual and impeded absorption into the industrial sectors constitutes a 
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Lewis turning period, rather than a point. In this conception hukou and discriminatory 
behaviour against China's large rural-to-urban migrant workforce act as institutional 
bottlenecks that are responsible for the premature appearance that China's labour surplus has 
been exhausted. Instead it remains, and remains a threat in terms of Freeman's great doubling. 
Fresh figures concerning China's land to labour ratio confirms a case of huge 
underemployment in the economy's primary sector. While high-income economies have on 
average one labourer to 42.5 ha of arable land, higher middle-income economies have on 
average a ratio of 5.8 ha. China's land to labour ratio is 0.47 ha for every labourer (Wang and 
Weaver 2013). With data from the All China Data Center, it is possible to extend this figures 
and also make estimated predictions regarding the future of China's primary sector 
employment. Since 2003 employment in this sector has been decreasing, and keeping all else 
constant, with this decline the figure will reach 100 million employed in the primary sector 
by 2024, and 25 million by 2030. Considering the amount of arable land China has, and 
assuming it remains constant over this period, 25 million in the primary sector leaves the land 
to labour ratio at 4.87 ha for each labourer. At this stage, in 2030, and without dramatic 
external shocks, it might be the case that China will emerge from having a labour surplus and 
join the other higher middle-income economies in what are considered to be normal 
development. 
The second key issues was a deeper look at the nature of China's supposedly rising wages. 
While real wages have risen, and skill mismatches in labour supply have occurred, that 
consumption as a share of GDP has declined, while savings have remained consistent, it 
would appear that Chinese household share of GDP is what has declined. This amounts to 
decreasing degrees of China's consistent and phenomenal growth resulting in the hands of the 
general population. While income per capita continues to grow, the extensive growth that the 
early period of China's reforms was known for, has dissipated. Beyond state revenue, 
company profits and the minority of high-skilled, high-income earners, the country still exists 
largely in poverty. Minimum wage is low when compared to neighbouring developing 
economies, and have largely stagnated, when they are paid at all (Chan 2003). Globally, 
China's labour has the lowest share of national income and increasing real wages are yet to 
converge with other developing economies (Dollar and Jones 2013). Inequality is growing. 
Regional equality had been the cause of reported labour shortages, but now this is easing 
somewhat as companies are moving away from the coast. However high-skill and 
knowledge-intensive incomes have rocketed past the still low, labour-intensive incomes 
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(Yang et al.2010). Again, hukou maintains a labour market situation that conceals the extent 
of China's labour surplus. 
With data from the PENN World Tables, it is possible to extend claims stated by The 
Economist (2007), that the Chinese consumption share of GDP was declining, and signified a 
reduction in the household share of national income. According to the fresh data the 
consumption share of GDP has continued to drop since 2006. Considering this in conjunction 
with Dollar and Jones's (2013) work on declining labour share, and Kuijs' (2005) and 
Modigliani and Cao's (2004) earlier work regarding the nature of China's savings, it would 
seem that China's inequality has continued to rise as labour's share of growth is diminishing. 
Looking at World Bank figures from 1990 to 2009 it would appear that this is indeed the 
case, as those in the bottom quintile are seeing less of the pie as time goes on, while those at 
the top are earning more. 
Finally, the third issue split into two subsections. An examination of China's impact on the 
markets highlighted both fears of crowding out in terms of flooding export markets with 
cheap goods, and also undercutting practices in labour standards. While China's comparative 
advantage lies in labour-intensive industries, through technological progress, inward flowing 
FDI, and increased international trade, its economy's capacity to innovate and compete in 
high-tech products ought to increase. Indeed China is already the world's number one 
exporter of ICTs. It is thought that the fragmenting of the global production chain has 
allowed China to benefit so immensely in this respect. However that this production chain 
has relocated in China signifies more a redirection, rather than an outright crowding out, and 
neighbouring exporters are sharing in the growth of the entire region, even if this means 
China becomes a central hub. 
With the aid of WTO Trade Profiles it is possible to examine trade flows, and the varying 
degrees of importance various partners are to one another, and the shifts between these 
degrees. Continuing beyond 2005 (See 2008) to 2012 it is evident that China's share of global 
exports continued to increase while Japan's has decreased. However, most of China's 
neighbours experienced a slight increase in this period. This suggests that, other than for 
Japan, there is not much evidence of crowding out. Indeed See's claim that China is 
redirecting, rather than displacing, its neighbours exports to the West is supported by the 
increase in importance in China for those economies' exports. However, this is more the case 
for the more developed of these economies than it is for the less developed. This coupled 
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with the fact that China is increasingly exporting back to those less developed countries does 
suggest that in terms of regional impact, the weaker economies may find it difficult to 
compete with China. 
As for a race to the bottom in terms of labour standards, it would seem that there does exist 
empirical evidence that makes it at least difficult to refute the claim that MNCs pursue 
greater profits through lower taxation, cheaper labour, and slack labour and environmental 
regulations. It would also seem that due to this being the case, countries seek to undercut one 
another in their attempt to attract (or maintain) FDI by meeting those conditions that favour 
greater profits. Despite there now being a greater consumer demand for the ensuring that their 
goods are not made by exploited workforces, there is also empirical evidence that this 
undercutting competition between developing countries exists not so much at labour 
regulations, but in enforcing such.  
The key issues have been: China's Lewis turning point and the extent of its reserve labour 
surplus; whether or not rising Chinese wages signal an end to this surplus, and; China's 
regional impact in terms of crowding out and causing a race to the bottom in labour 
standards. It would appear that the hukou system has artificially and prematurely brought 
about the symptoms of China having achieved its Lewis turning point and considering the 
alarmingly low land to labour ratio, it seems that China's reserve labour surplus is still quite 
extensive. In terms of reports of rising wages and labour shortages, once the figures are 
looked at more closely, these reports mask the reality of increasing inequality and a sustained 
reduction in the labour share of growth. Trade flows suggest that fears of crowding out can 
largely be put aside, however weaker economies will face difficulty in this respect, this fear 
being supported by recent evidence that MNCs do seek lower production costs, that countries 
do seek to lower these costs in order to attract or maintain FDI, and they do so not in 
instituting labour regulations, but in the enforcement of those standards. 
 
5     CONCLUSION 
The research question was: Does China present to the global economy a labour supply large 
to the extent that it will upset the current capital to labour ratio, resulting in a new and lower 
equilibrium in terms of returns to labour? It was derived from the debate between free-
market, free-trade globalisation theory, and theory concerning fears of a Great Doubling of 
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cheap labour in the global market which would cause a race to the bottom in terms of labour 
standards. The hypotheses stated to test the race to the bottom theory, and answer the 
research question were: Hypothesis 2: Rising incomes do not signify the depletion of China's 
reserve labour surplus; Hypothesis 3.1: China's increasing share of world exports implies a 
crowding out effect among other regional economies; Hypothesis 3.2: MNCs pursue cheaper 
production costs; Countries compete in terms of these costs, and; Countries with high labour 
standards fail to attract FDI. 
This research set out three sections in order to test these hypotheses: China's Lewis turning 
point; China's income levels, and; regional impact, which was in turn subdivided into 
crowding out and labour standards. The research employed a treatment of the literature 
relevant to each of these branches of the argument, in the construction of an argument based 
on key issues. Findings for each hypotheses were made based on these treatments in 
conjunction with fresh empirical data taken from various sources. What now follows is a 
conclusive discussion of the findings, taking each hypothesis in order. 
Hypothesis 1: China has not reached its Lewis turning point 
This section began by outlining Richard Freeman's Great Doubling theory which sets up the 
logic of the hypotheses and the order in which the underpinning claims are tested. The theory 
states that there is a great doubling of the global labour stock with the entry of economies 
such as China into the global economy and that this will cause a shift in the traditional global 
division of labour as China comes to compete with developed economies in high-value 
production but at lower costs due to its large reserve labour supply that will naturally 
suppress wages. If this is the case it would be expected that the world's labour standards 
would reach a lower equilibrium than the sort of economic development that is touted by 
globalisation theory, which insists that greater openness causes a race to the top in this 
respect. The extent of China's reserve labour force, then, is paramount to this process, and so 
when China reaches its Lewis turning point, or if it has already, is key to answering the 
research question. According to Krugman (2013) and Cai (2008) it is the case that China has 
already done so as wages are rising and there are reported labour shortages. However, upon 
further examination these instances might more appropriately be explained by market 
segmentation and China's huokou system that regulates the labour market. China's land to 
labour ratio is astoundingly low at 0.47 ha compared to other higher middle-income countries 
(Wang and Wan 2014), and based on a data analysis this comparable figure will not be 
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achieved until 2030. The premature appearance of China's Lewis turning point is therefore 
more likely to be caused by such institutional bottlenecks as the hukou system (ibid.), reform 
of which should allow the release of China's still extensive reserve labour surplus (Dollar and 
Jones 2013). 
Hypothesis 2: Rising incomes do not signify the depletion of China's reserve labour surplus 
The next section returned to the question of rising wages and labour shortages. Through the 
treatment of the literature it argues that while China has experienced real poverty reduction, 
in the latter half of the reform period it would seem that extensive growth has been replaced 
by intensive growth as the labour share has been decreasing. Consumption share of GDP has 
decreased, meaning that people are not partaking in China's phenomenal growth. While it 
could have meant that households were saving their share of the growth, it appears to be the 
case that China's high savings are resultant of high government revenues and company profits 
(Kuijs 2005; Modigliani and Cao 2004). In support of this claim, the literature provides 
anecdotal evidence that while wages in high-skill sectors are rocketing, they are plummeting 
or stagnating elsewhere (Chan 2003). Fresh data illustrate the continuation of the trends 
stated in the literature. It would appear that due to rising inequality and continued decreases 
in consumption share of GDP, claiming that China's reserve labour surplus has been 
exhausted based on rising wages is unfounded. 
Hypothesis 3.1: China's increasing share of world exports implies a crowding out effect 
among other regional economies 
See (2008) argues that China's capture of global exports shares does not signify displacement, 
but a redirection of exports as regional neighbours export to China instead of the West. 
Figures from the WTO Trade Profiles support this claim, however, they also suggest that for 
the weaker economies exporting to China is less prominent than for other advanced 
neighbours. Also, it appears that China is increasingly exporting to these weaker economies. 
These processes suggest that the possibility does indeed exist that China could overwhelm its 
weaker neighbours. However, the literature argues that it is possible to rise with China, if 
niches in production are found, that complement China's production for export to the West. 
As for the what China presents to those advanced economies, while traditionally its 
economy's comparative advantage lay in labour-intensive production, this is upgrading and 
could pose threats to high-value production due to its lower costs. So while there exists signs 
of crowding out, it is difficult to say conclusively in these respects what China will present to 
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both advanced and developing economies as niches may be discovered and new, higher-tech 
innovations made (Alternburgh et al. 2008; Bremmer et al. 2006; See 2008). 
Hypothesis 3.2: MNCs pursue cheaper production costs; Countries compete in terms of these 
costs; Countries with high labour standards fail to attract FDI 
Based on Olney (2013) and Davies and Vladamannati (2013), there appears to be empirical 
evidence that at least makes it difficult to dismiss the asking of these questions. Between 
these two papers and OLS regressions therein, it appears that when employment protection 
rules are less strict and the cost of production is lowered, this does attract FDI, particularly 
when capital is more mobile (Olney 2013). Also that when competing countries lower 
standards, hosts of FDI do indeed follow suit, and that a significant and negative correlation 
exists between protection and FDI, which therefore suggests that FDI does respond to 
restriction on capital to labour (ibid.). Further to these findings, while there may be limited 
evidence in terms of the instituting of labour laws and standards, there is more and open 
competition in labour standard practice and enforcement suggesting that it may be true that 
MNCs seek countries with apparent labour regulations due to growing consumer awareness 
and brand reputation (Davies and Vladamannati 2013). However, if these regulations are not 
enforced it results in a win-win for FDI as reputation remains intact and production costs 
remain low. 
From the treatment of the literature, and in conjunction with fresh data analysis, it would 
seem that: H1 is confirmed - China has not yet achieved its Lewis turning point and maintains 
a large reserve labour surplus underemployed in the primary sector that looks likely to sustain 
itself for almost another two decades; H2 is also confirmed - rising wages do not signify the 
exhaustion of this reserve labour surplus, but rising inequality as the labour share of growth 
diminishes; H3.1 is more ambiguous - while China shows limited signs of crowding out its 
neighbours due to the extent of its reserve labour surplus, it remains inconclusive as to what 
this might mean for its neighbours as both the possibility of externalities coming to bear on 
the process, and the possibility of complementary niche production could either reverse the 
trends, or cause them to be beneficial; H3.2 is confirmed based on the literature - arguments 
that claim MNCs do not seek lower transaction costs, that countries do not seek to attract FDI 
through lowering such costs, and that lax enforcement of such regulations is not positively 
correlated with the presence of MNCs no longer have the final say as, due to fresh empirical 
evidence, it would seem that it might be the case that a race to the bottom is afoot. 
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In conclusion, and based on the thorough examination of the literature on the topic, in 
conjunction with fresh data analysis, China's reserve labour surplus looks far from being 
exhausted, and while the nature of the implications of this are essentially inconclusive, there 
do appear to be signs that, due to the extent of its huge supply of cheap labour, China might 
be tipping the balance somewhat in favour of capital and posing the possibility of a global 
race to the bottom in terms of labour standards, a cause for concern and strong reflection on 
our global economic policies. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1.1 China's primary sector employment and land to labour ratio, 1978-2008
 
 Source: All China Data Center (2014) 
Appendix 1.2 Estimated primary sector employment decline
 
Source: All China Data Center (2014) 
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Appendix 2.1 Consumption share of GDP as % 
 
Source: Heston et al. 2012                                                                                                                                  
Note: Consumption Share of PPP Converted GDP Per Capita at current prices. 
 
Appendix 2.2 Distribution of China's wealth 
 
Source: World Bank 2014                                                                                                                                  
Note: Percentage share of income or consumption is the share that accrues to subgroups of population indicated 
by quintiles for the year 2009. 
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Appendix 3.1 Share of global exports for Asian economies
                     
Source: WTO various years                                                                                                                                
Note: The data for appendices 3.1 - 4.4 are taken from merchandise trade alone, and consider only the top five 
destinations/origins for each economy, as was available in the Trade Profiles. 
 
Appendix 3.2 Share of global exports for G1 economies and China
                     
Source: WTO various years 
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Appendix 3.3 Share of global exports for G2 economies and China
                     
Source: WTO various years 
 
Appendix 3.4 Share of US imports
                     
Source: WTO various years 
 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
0 
0.5 
1 
1.5 
2 
2.5 
3 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
C
h
in
a 
 %
  
S
h
ar
e 
G
2
  
%
  
S
h
ar
e 
Malaysia Thailand Indonesia 
Philippines China 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
%
  
S
h
ar
e 
Japan China 
47 
 
Appendix 3.5 Export shares of G1 economies 
                         
Source: WTO various years 
 
Appendix 3.6 Export shares of G2 economies 
                         
Source: WTO various years 
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Appendix 3.7 Asia's export shares (excluding China) 
                         
Source: WTO various years 
 
Appendix 3.8, 3.9 G1 economies' exports to region 
  
Source: WTO various years 
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Appendix 4.1, 4.2 G2 economies' exports to region 
  
Source: WTO various years 
 
Appendix 4.3 G1's import shares to China 
                         
Source: WTO various years 
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Appendix 4.4 G2's import shares to China 
                         
Source: WTO various years 
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